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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of lJ tah 
WILFRED A. ROGALSKI, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 7982 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The respondent fails to state whether he disagrees with 
the Statement of Facts set forth in the Brief of Appellant. 
Instead, he proceeds to make a number of inaccurate statements, 
and also argumentative assertions unwarranted by the record. 
The appellant will discuss some of the inaccuracies in statements 
of respondent in reply to the points listed in the Brief of Re-
spondent. The respondent avoids all reference to the admis-
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sions of the respondent and the undisputed facts which show 
that plaintiff established no cause of action against defendant. 
On page 2, in his Preliminary Statement, respondent states 
that the case was "submitted to a jury with appropriate instruc-
tions as to the definition of a business visitor or invitee and the 
duty of care owed to such a person." The instructions will 
be searched in vain for any appropriate definition of a business 
visitor or for any information as to the distinction between a 
business visitor and a mere licensee and a trespasser. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT 
Point I 
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM THAT "THIS CASE WAS 
PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY - THE EVI-
DENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS A BUSINESS VISITOR AND THAT DEFENDANT 
HAD VIOLATED THE DUTY OF CARE OWED TO 
SUCH A PERSON." 
Respondent states on page 9: "The question before this 
Court, of course, is not whether the facts disclose negligent 
conduct on the part of defendant, but only whether there was 
sufficient evidence from which the jury could make a finding." 
In other words, the respondent insists that the objective test 
of negligence based upon the standard of the conduct of a 
reasonable and prudent person, is inapplicable, and that the 
subjective test of what jurors might conclude from conjectures 
should be adopted. The cited case of Stickle v. Union Pacific 
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Railroad Co., 251 P. 2d 867, 870, does not depart from the 
rule of an objective standard that the evidence must be sufficient 
to warrant reasonable and prudent men to find the defendant 
guilty of negligence. 
In arguing that there was evidence from which the 
jury could find that Rogalski was a business visitor, respondent 
studiously avoids the undisputed fact that the property of 
defendant covers a large area, and that the portion of real 
estate where plaintiff's employer was a business visitor was 
not the part of the land where Drouby was a lessee nor a 
part of the land of defendant where the injury occurred. The 
evidence shows that plaintiff knew that the concrete slab and 
the appurtenances were adjacent to and connected with the 
maintenance shops. In an attempt to evade the basic facts, 
plaintiff argues: 
"The defendant urges upon this Court a very arti-
ficial and untenable conception of what constitutes a 
business visitor. It is defendant's contention that the 
plaintiff's status must be determined with a tape meas-
ure, based upon the number of feet the place he was 
injured was from the point at which business was 
actually transacted, or whether or not money was ac-
tually paid by the plaintiff (or his employer) to be 
where he was, or whether or not he had been expressly 
invited to enter the particular area in question . . . " 
Inferentially, respondent argues that being a business 
visitor on some property owned by defendant, the jury could 
guess that Rogalski had an implied invitation to enter upon 
any other property owned by defendant if there was no fence 
nor. other formidable barricade. The argument of respondent 
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might sound a little plausible if there were a case involving an 
attractive nuisance and the injured party were a child of tender 
years; but clearly in this case, defendant's customers did not 
go to the place where the injury occurred, and the plaintiff 
himself had seen the place from a distance almost daily with-
out having ventured onto the platform prior to the day when 
his employer instructed him to steam-dean the undercarriage 
of his employer's truck (R. 12 5) . 
The "implied invitation" theory is without evidentiary 
foundation in this case. The appellant does not disagree with 
the rule that an invitation might be implied, but an examina-
tion of the cited cases indicates that the implied invitation 
arises · from the nature of the premises to which visitors 
generally are induced to come. There was no implied invita-
tion for the public or any customers to come onto the concrete 
platform to wash or steam-dean the undercarriage of trucks 
at the expense of the defendant. There was nothing about 
the existence of the maintenance shop and the adjacent wash-
ing platform and adjacent caustic soda tarik which would 
constitute an implied invitation to a reasonable and prudent 
member of the general public or of truck owners generally, 
to come onto that concrete platform to steam-dean their trucks 
just because they happened to be purchasing petroleum products 
on some other portion of the land owned by defendant. 
Furthermore, the "implied invitation" theory is predicated 
upo~ the concept that the owner of the premises has given a 
standing invitation for the public or some class to come at any 
time during business hours, by the very nature of the premises. 
Although respondent implies by argument that Parley Drouby, 
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the employer of respondent, claimed a right to go upon the con-
crete platform and use the washing facilities, the admissions of 
Drouby negative such a claim. Drouby expressly admitted that 
he had no right to be there (R. 87). Nor is there any evi-
dence that the defendant acquiesced in the use of that platform 
by Drouby, for he did not claim that he sought permission 
of any company official when he did use it, and he admitted 
that when he had asked any company official he had been refus-
ed permission (R. 86, 87, 92). He testified that when he wanted 
to use the washing facilities he "usually checked with the 
people in the maintenance to see if they were going to be 
using it, or if I was going to be in anybody's way." He ac-
knowledged the fact that he had no arrangements for going 
onto the concrete slab or for using any of the facilities (R. 
86-87). 
The testimony. of Parley Drouby negatives the implied 
invitation theory. He took the liberty of using the facilities, 
not by invitation, but because he found it advantageous to 
himself financially to do so, by washing his trucks at the 
expense of the defendant. He did not get any express permis-
sion~ but he merely ascertained from some employee in the 
maintemince department whether the platform was going to 
be in use or if he would be in the way. At most, he could claim 
to be a bare licensee, not a business visitor on that concrete 
platform, and then only at the particular occasions when he 
made the inquiry. 
Respondent cites Martin .v. Jones, 253 P. 2d 359, for the 
contention that even if Drouby was a trespasser on the day 
in question, plaintiff could recover if defendant's employees 
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knew of his presence and failed to warn him of danger. The 
case is not applicable since the defendant did not know that 
Drouby fas using the premises on the day in question. Nor 
did Drouby claim that he took the trouble to find out if de-
fendant's maintenance men would be using the washing 
facilities (R. 87). Inasmuch as Droubay claimed that the prac-
tice had been for him to make inquiry of someone in defendant's 
maintenance department to find out if the platform would be 
in use or if he would be in anybody's way, it is obvious that 
Droubay recognized the fact that he had no invitation to use 
the premises; and that even if he claimed permission on the 
particular occasions when he made inquiry, he knew he had 
to make inquiry on each occasion when he sought to use the 
platform. He never had the status of an invitee, and on the 
particular occasions when he had previously used the facilities, 
the most that he could have claimed, would have been permis-
sion; and that on the day in question, he produced no proof 
that he attempted to obtain permission from anyone, so that 
his status was not even that of a bare licensee, but that of a 
trespasser. 
Respondent's argument that the "jury could reasonably 
have inferred from this 'customary practice' that this same 
practice was followed on the day in question and that permis-
sion was expressly obtained," is patently absurd; for Droubay 
did not claim he had obtained permission from anyone on 
the day in question, and the jury could not properly infer that 
he had permission which he did not claim he had obtained. 
All he had previously done was to ascertain whether the 
maintenance employees of defendant were going to use the 
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platform or whther he would be in in anybody's way. Ascer-
taining that defendant would not be using the facilities on 
December 30, 1951, for example, could not be construed as 
permission to use the platform on January 18, 1952. Then 
too, it is significant that plaintiff did not see any of defendant's 
employees around, and Droubay likewise did not see them, 
so there could be no basis for the claimed inference of express 
permission or any permission at all. 
The contention that Droubay had an implied invitation 
to use the washing platform, because he was once an employee, 
is specious. When he ceased to be an employee, his duties to 
use the washing platform ceased. Those duties could not auto-
matically be transferred into rights, as a former employee has 
no implied rights to use the property of his former employer. 
The statement that Droubay had been "specifically in-
structed by defendant's sales department that these trucks 
should be kept clean," (R. 117) is a misstatement of the 
record. The sales department merely told Droubay that the 
trucks would look better if they were kept clean (R. 117). No 
one connected with defendant told Droubay that he could 
use the facilities of defendant to keep his tr~cks clean. All of 
the written instruments refute the contention that defendant 
imposed on Droubay the obligation to keep his trucks clean. 
The representative of the sales department made a recommen-
dation which was for the benefit of Droubay to assist him 
in getting business. Droubay did not claim he had any rights 
on the washing platform, as lessee or otherwise. The argu-
ments -that it was to the benefit of defendant for Droubay 
to use the washing platform are fat-fetched, since it was not 
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necessary for Droubay to use defendant's facilities in order 
to clean the trucks. There were other facilities available to him. 
All Droubay was interested in doing by using defendant's 
platform was. to save money. The argument about washing 
the trucks to keep the Phillips 66 insignia clean, could have 
no bearing on this accident anyway, because the accident re-
sulted not from any washing operation of the insignia, but 
from stepping off the concrete platform as a result of lack of 
visibility created by plaintiff himself while in the course of 
steam-cleaning the under-carriage of the truck. 
Likewise, the contention that Droubay was a lessee of 
defendant's property (R. 84), is also irrelevant, for he did 
not lease any of the property involved in the accident. The con-
crete platform was not an inducement for the lease, nor was 
said property an appurtenance to the leasehold. 
The argument of respondent proceeds upon the nakea 
theory that the plaintiff was a business visitor at the place 
where the accident occurred, when plaintiff himself showed 
by his testimony that he was merely carrying out the instruc-
tions of his employer Droubay in a negligent manner. 
The alleged negligence of the defendant. 
The whole argument of respondent is predicated upon 
the notion that plaintiff was a business yisitor at the place 
where the accident occurred, because he was a business visitor 
earlier that day on some other portion of the land owned by 
defendant. The plaintiff had completed the loading of the 
petroleum products. He went from the leasehold directly to 
10 
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the concrete platform. Now just what duties does respondent 
claim appellant violated? 
It is clear that the following answer to written inter-
rogatories constitute the only claim of negligence: 
"14. No warning signs, directions, or instructions pro-
vi~ed; no cover over the vat; vat placed too close to steam clean-
ing equipment; no proper protection or barricades around vat 
for person working in vicinity; insufficient visibility provided 
when steam hose in use." 
1. The claim that there were no warning signs. By quoting 
from the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 343, the 
plaintiff must concede that even to a business visitor there 
could be no liability if theowner of land does not know, or 
by the exercise of reasonable care could not discover, the con-
dition involving an unreasonable risk. There could be no risk 
to any person who looked and acted as a reasonable and pru-
dent person. The testimony of the plaintiff shows that he could 
have seen the tank adjacent to the concrete platform except 
for two things: ( 1) He did not look before he started to 
use the steam equipment, and in fact paid no attention what-
soever, to any objects to his right. ( 2) After he began to use 
the steam, he created a cloud which completely obscured his 
vision by the manner in which he operated the steam. The lack 
of warning signs could not have contributed to the accident 
since the plaintiff never looked in the direction of the tank 
before he started to use the steam, and after he started to 
steam-dean, he obscured his own view to such an extent that 
he could not see such a sign had one been there. Likewise, 
11 
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it would have been futile for the defendant to have given 
any instructions as to the use of the tank, inasmuch as use 
of the tank was not the cause of the accident, but blindly 
stepping into it. If respondent refers to instructions as to the 
existence of such tank, he could not possibly claim more than 
mere warning signs, and as pointed out above, such signs 
would have been useless in view of the reckless disposition of 
the plaintiff on that occasion. 
2. The claim there was no cover over the vat: The evi-
dence is conclusive that said caustic soda tank had a lid which 
was fastened by hinges. Plaintiff did. not observe when he 
· drove onto the concrete ramp whether the lid was up or down 
(R. 160). Droubay testified that the cover-lid of the tank was 
down when not in use, as far as he was able to observe 
(R. 77). There is no evidence whatsoever that when the 
Droubay truck was parked on the platform the cover-lid was 
up instead of down. There is no proof that the tank was in 
use on the day of the accident, and there is no evidence that 
any of the defendant's employees raised that cover lid. Droubay 
did not observe whether the lid was up or down when they 
came onto the platform (R. 114, 127, 160). Neither Droubay 
nor plaintiff saw any employees of the defendant working in 
that immediate vicinity on the day of the accident (R. 77, 
108, 114, 172-173), so there is no evidence from which a 
valid inference could be raised that any of the defendant's 
employees lifted the cover-lid on January 18th. For anyone 
to conclude that the cover lid was up at the time plaintiff 
came onto the platform, would be mere conjecture. Further· 
more, to conclude that one of defendant's employees must have 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
neglected to dose down the lid on some previous day or to 
have raised it on the day of the accident when it was not being 
used by defendant, would be predicated on speculation which 
likewise would not be characteristic of the thinking of a rea-
sonable and prudent man. 
3. The claim that the vat was too close to the steam-cleaning 
equipment: On page 21 of his brief, respondent states that 
the ramp is "barely wide enough for a truck of the type 
involved to be parked thereon and still room for a man using 
the steam cleaning equipment to walk around it (R. 102, 125, 
15 5) . " The statement is a distortion of the record. The truck 
was only 7 feet 1 inch in width. The platform is 1 inch less 
than 14 feet in width, so there was a total of nearly 7 feet for 
working space. Since the plaintiff claimed he parked the truck 
about 3 feet from the east end of the platform, and that he 
had no difficulty working around to that point, the argument 
of the plaintiff amounts to a further indicatjon of negligence 
on the part of the plaintiff, by parking the truck too close to 
the edge of the concrete platform. Parley Droubay had pre-
viously washed trucks and he had also steam-cleaned the 
undercarriage of trucks without difficulty. The fact is, that 
plaintiff realized he had parked too close to the edge, and 
that he had no room to work on the right side of the truck 
without geting off the concrete platform at a place where he 
knew there were "obstructions." The argument of respondent 
merely indicates greater negligence on the part o~ plaintiff in 
·failure to move the truck farther to the north so that he could 
work on the concrete platform. The argument also empha-
sizes the negligence of the plaintiff in his indisposition to 
13 
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make any observations as to objects near or adjacent to the 
platform. 
As admitted by the plaintiff, the caustic soda tank was 
entirely off the platform, 2 inches away, and extended 13 
to 14 inches above the platform. Obviously, the platform and 
the tank had to be in a position where defendant could use 
the same. The same were clearly visible to all persons who 
looked, and the only excuse for plaintiff not being able to see 
the tank was his indisposition to look to see what could clearly 
be seen. 
4. The claim there was no barricade around the vat: In-
asmuch as plaintiff for all practical purposes blind-folded him-
self so that he could not see where he was going, if there had 
been a barricade around the tank, plaintiff might have suffered 
a worse injury by running into such barricade or falling over 
it head-first. A barricade of any substantial height would have 
made it impossible to use the tank, and appellant submits that 
no reasonable and prudent landowner can possibly forsee 
what will happen to a person who ~ither shuts his eyes when 
moving around, or blindfolds himself so he cannot see what 
he is doing or where he is going. 
5. The claim that there was insufficient visibility when 
the steam hose was in use: Respondent states that "One operat-
ing the steam cleaning equipment, which is located on the 
opposite side of the ramp than the vat, would normally be 
unable, from that location, to see the vat because of the truck" 
(Page 21). But the truck was not placed there by defendant, 
but by the plaintiff. Defendant did nothing to obscure any 
14 
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one's view. Although respondent contends that Droubay him-
self did not see the tank on the day of the accident, Droubay 
merely testified that he paid no attention to it (R. 74). Re-
spondent further says: "The steam cleaning equipment, when 
in operation, greatly affected the vision of one using it (R. 
1 31) . " Such statement is not correct, for it depends on how 
a person directs the steam. All a person needs to do in order 
to see where he is going, while the steam is on, is to turn the 
nozzle to one side, particularly up in the air (R. 165-170). 
There was nothing defective about the concrete platform. 
It was not slippery. The stumbling of plaintiff was due to lack 
of visibility which he created himself. There was nothing wrong 
with the steam-cleaning equipment, either. It was not shown 
to be defective. The steam cloud of which plaintiff complains, 
and the attendant lack of visibility, was not created by the· 
defendant, but by plaintiff himself. He created that steam cloud 
in his own path, and he recklessly proceeded into that cloud. 
It would have been impossible for defendant to have created 
visibility, when plaintiff willfully did everything conceivable 
to blind himself and incapacitated himself from seeing where 
he was going by the manner in which he operated the steam. 
The defendant did not cause the plaintiff to step off the 
concrete platform into the caustic soda tank. Defendant had 
nothing to do with the movements or activities of plaintiff. 
In fact, there is no proof that · defendant knew plaintiff was 
even in the vicinity of the place where the injury occurred. 
Nor is there any proof that defendant knew that someone had 
raised the cover-lid to the caustic soda tank. Admittedly, 
Droubay failed to inform plaintiff of the caustic soda tank; 
15 
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but no one representing defendant ditected plaintiff to either 
go onto the platform or to step off the platform. By no pos-
sible stretch of the imagination could defendant be expected 
to warn plaintiff when defendant did not know he was going 
to be there, nor of a condition which it did not know existed 
' inasmuch as the practice was to keep the cover lid down 
when the tank was not in use. 
Plaintiff utterly failed to prove violation of any duty 
of care by defendant. Defendant could not anticipate that any-
one going onto the concrete platform, whether by permission 
or without permission, would deliberately obscure his own 
vision in disregard of his own safety; nor could defendant 
anticipate that the cover-lid to the tank (which was then not 
in use that day by defendant's employees), had been raised 
by someone. 
Point II. 
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM THAT "PLAINTIFF WAS 
NOT GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS 
A MATTER OF LAW.'' 
It is interesting to note that respondent claims that proof 
of contributory negligence must be established beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, in order to take a case from the jury. 
In this case, the respondent himself furnished the proof 
of his own neglect, and of his utter disregard for his own 
safety, and he now claims that his own admissions should 
be disregarded, to enable the jury to disbelieve his admissions 
16 
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and to permit him to recover because of his own negligence. 
What respondent seems to contend is that the plaintiff having 
been negligent, such negligence imposed upon the defendant 
as owner of the premises a duty to rescue plaintiff from the 
effects of his own negligence. It would appear that the "last 
clear chance" doctrine is invoked by implication in a situation 
to which in could have no possible application. 
On page 27, respondent argues that the question is "what 
a reasonable man steam cleaning his employe's truck on a 
January day, with clouds of white steam being emitted from 
the nozzle in his hands, would have done." The statement 
begs the question, for a reasonable and prudent man would 
not turn the nozzle to emit steam in the same direction as he 
was moving, nor deliberately walk into a cloud of steam where 
he could not see what he was doing nor where he was going. 
Respondent argues that because Droubay paid no attention 
to the caustic soda tank on the day in question, plaintiff could 
not be expected to pay any attention either, which is another 
way of saying that if one person does not act as a reasonable 
and prudent man, no other person can be expected to do so, 
and such indifference to safety cannot amount to contributory 
negligence. Likewise, the contention that there were obstruc-
tions to the view of plaintiff, is also a misstatement of the 
record, for the exhibits introduced by plaintiff dead y show that 
plaintiffs views were not obstructed except by the obstructions 
which he created himself. 
Respondent argues on page 28 that the "jury in this case 
found, and justly so, that it was not unreasonable for the 
defendant to have proceeded around the truck as he did, 
17 
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operating the equipment and keeping his hip against the 
fender of the truck. The fact that he could have moved the 
nozzle does not mean that it was unreasonable for him not 
to have done so. This was a question for the jury." Appellant 
submits that no reasonable and prudent person would blind-
fold himself and move forward near the edge of a platform 
near which were unknown objects. The evidence shows that 
plaintiff knew how to make his path visible by merely turning 
the nozzle to one side and waiting a moment for the steam to 
disappear. The jury could not act as reasonable and prudent 
men if they concluded that by blinding himself and mov-
ing forward blindly in an area of unknown objects, the 
plaintiff was acting with due care for his own safety. 
The respondent seems to urge a rule of law that the 
more negligent a person becomes, the greater the duty of 
care imposed upon the landowner by virtue of such negligence, 
notwithstanding such negligent conduct is unknown to the 
landowner. 
The premises where plaintiff was working were not in-
herently dangerous. The only actual danger claimed was the 
alleged lack of cover on the tank at the moment plaintiff stepped 
over into it. If some unknown person had not raised that cover 
lid, it is not certain whether or not plaintiff would have sus·· 
tained some injuries, since he was moving blindly into an 
area which he had not observed. With the cover-lid down, 
if he stumbl{!d, he might well have fallen against the stop 
bar against which the cover-lid rests when the tank is open. 
It was the conduct of plaintiff which was fraught with dangec 
except for which no injury would have been sustained. 
18 
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Respondent cites a number of cases which hold that where 
there is a conflict in the evidence from which reasonable 
minds might differ as to whether the plaintiff was negligent, 
the trial court may not take the case from the jury on motion 
for directed verdict on the ground of contributory negligence. 
Those cases are inapplicable, for in this case there is no 
dispute in the evidence as to the conduct of plaintiff, and 
there is no basis for reasonable minds to conclude that he 
was not negligent. The answer to all of those cases is the 
rule laid d0wn in Nabrotsky v. Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Co., 
103 Utah 274, 135 P. 2d 115, there the court held that the 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law when he was temporarily blinded by the glaring lights 
of another car approaching from the opposite direction, but 
proceeded onto the tracks and was injured by collision of 
his car with an approaching train. This case presents a far 
worse case of contributory negligence than the Nabrotsky 
case, for in this case plaintiff was blinded by his own acts, 
not the acts of a third party. 
Point III. 
THE CLAIM THAT "THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ERR IN THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE." 
The respondent does not state correctly the purpose of 
the proffered evidence. The offer was not merely to "show 
some inconsistency," but to introduce the admissions of the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff was called upon not to repeat testimony 
previously given at the trial, as contended by him in his brief, 
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but to acknowledge the admissions made by him on depo-
sition which show that he knew exactly how to.avoid obscuring 
his view, by turning the steam nozzle away, and waiting mo~ 
mentarily ·for the steam cloud to clear away. 
True, the plaintiff had already testified to facts which 
showed that it was his own negligent conduct which prevented 
him from seeing where he was going; but he had. predicated 
his right of recovery, in part, at least upon ignorance, and the 
proffered testimony demonstrated that he knew how to avoid 
the condition, and that he could have avoided injury by look-
ing where he was going and that he blinded himself well-
knowing that he could have held the nozzle in a position 
where he could have seen his surroundings. 
Point IV. 
THE CLAIM THAT "THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY OR IN REFUSING 
TO SUBMIT DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TIONS." 
There is absolutely no substance to the contention that 
defendant's requested instructions were substantially covered 
in the charge to the jury. In the first place, the trial court did 
not define or distinguish the term "business visitor" and left 
the matter of definition to the conjecture of the jury. The 
argument that defendant did not make a special plea that 
plaintiff was either a bare licensee or a trespasser, and that 
defendant merely denied that plaintiff was a business visitor, 
assumes that defendant could not prove that plaintiff w;IS 
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only a trespasser or at best a licensee under a denial that 
plaintiff was a business visitor. Respondent states on page 43: 
" ... As noted eariler in this brief, there may have 
been sufficient evidence offered to support a finding 
that plaintiff was a licensee or trespasser, ... Even 
assuming this, it is difficult to conceive how the de-
fendant in this case could have been prejudiced by 
the failure of the Court to so instruct." 
There can be no doubt about the fact that plaintiff pleaded 
that he was a business visitor and that he failed to prove any such 
relationship as far as the premises where the accident occurred. 
The court not only erred in denying the motion for directed 
verdict, but the court refused to instruct the jury on defendant's 
theory of the case. The court did not define "business visitor," 
and by refusing to give the requested instructions, the court 
in effect ruled that if plaintiff was a business visitor on January 
18th with respect to some portion of defendant's property, 
then he was a business visitor with respect to all of the property 
owned by defendant, irrespective of how remote the place 
might have been from any place where business could possibly 
be transacted. 
In order for the court to have correctly charged the .jury 
as to the meaning of the term "business visitor" to guide the 
jury in determining whether or not he was a business invitee 
at the place where the accident occurred, it was proper to 
distinguish that term from "bare licensee" and "trespasser." 
The cases cited by respondent where the defendant failed 
to request the court to instruct as to the difference, have no 
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application here, for the defendant specifically requested such 
definitions and the court refused to give any such definitions. 
. . .•f:; 
The assertion that the instructions requested by defendant 
did "not correctly state or apply the law," is contrary to the 
record. In fact, plaintiff · does not take · the trouble to point 
out wherein· any of ·the requests of ·defendant which the court 
rejected, incorrectly states the law. 
Respondent completely ignores the fact that the court re-
fused to instruct the jury as to defendant's theory of the case. 
Point V. 
THE CLAIM THAT "THERE WAS NO DEFECT IN 
PARTIES-THIS ACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY AND 
BROUGHT IN BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF AND THE 
STATE INSURANCE FUND." 
The claim is ·extravagant, for the letter from the State 
Insurance Fund cannot be construed as an assignment of any 
claims asserted by the State Insurance Fund, nor to constitute 
the plaintiff a trustee. The defendant did not waive its ·objection 
that the ~tate Insurance Fund was a necessary party in view 
of its claim, notwithstanding said claim was unfounded. None 
of the cases cited by respondent establish any law to the con-
trary. 
. ' ' ~. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent cites a number of cases, none of which are 
applicable to the facts of this case. Respondent predicated his 
case upon the false premise that he was a business visitor 
where the accident occurred, when his employer made no such 
claim. Respondent made extravagant and untenable claims 
of negligence; but the fact is that the premises were safe 
where Droubay told plaintiff to work. Neither the concrete 
platform nor the steam cleaning equipment was defective. The 
only reason the accident occurred is that plaintiff for all prac-
tical purposes figuratively blindfolded himself by the manner 
in which he operated the steam, and while blinded by his own 
.negligent conduct, he stepped off the platform over into a 
tank of caustic soda· which was plainly visible to any person 
who would look. Notwithstanding the evidence of plaintiff's 
negligence came from his own lips since none of defend-
ant's employees or officials knew he was in the vicinity or 
witnessed the accident, respondent contends that his own 
undisputed evidence of reckless disregard for his own safety 
could be viewed as acts of due care by reasonable and prudent 
persons. 
Appellant contends that the record compels a finding 
that there was no negligence on the part of defendant, and 
further that the record requires a finding upon the undisputed 
testimony and admissions of plaintiff that his own egligence 
was a proximate cause of the accident. Appellant further sub-
mits that not only did the trial court err in allowing the jury 
to find defendant guilty of negligence, but that the court re-
fused to furnish the jury any standards or guides, and the 
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court refused to instruct the jury on defendant's theory of the 
case, all of which warrants reversal of the judgment. 
Respectfufly submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN & RICHARDS, 
and PAUL E. REIMANN 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant: 
Received a copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant, 
this ________ c ___________ day of September, 1953. 
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